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Steven L. Schwarcz **
In a prior article, the author asked why, if a sovereign debt restructuring
treaty would be effective and easy to implement, one does not yet exist.
There appeared to be at least three reasons: the very novelty of the
approach; the opposition of interest groups who believe that a treaty
approach would make it too easy for sovereign debtors to default; and the
failure of parties to appreciate the importance of a treaty approach, coupled
with concern over ceding sovereignty.! In this short reverie, the author
hopes to show that these reasons are flawed and that, even where bond
issues already include collective action clauses, a treaty approach would
benefit both debtor-nations and their creditors.

The room hushed as Premier Gursky walked in. Gursky glared at his
ministers, finally focusing on Y osef Steif. As Minister of Finance, Steif knew
what was coming.
"Trans-Ptomaineia is rapidly exhausting its foreign reserves, and I fear we
will have no choice soon but to default on our bonds," said the Premier. "I want
you, Minister Steif, to examine our options and to report back within two days.
If we default, or if we restructure our debts unilaterally, our nation will suffer
grave reputational costs in the world fmandal community."z Steif immediately
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set his staff to explore the sovereign debt restructuring options. The computers
were temporarily down-"damn, a decade after Y2K and still there are bugs in
the system"-so staff members actually had to start their research in one of their
country's few remaining libraries. Twenty-four hours later, the staff reported
back with two possible approaches: one depending solely on privately negotiated
agreements between their nation and its creditors (a "contractual approach"), the
other based on a public international law convention, or treaty, among nations (a
"treaty approach").
Under the contractual approach, for each bond issue requiring individual
bondholder approval to change essential payment terms (such as the amount of
principal, the rate of interest, or the maturity schedule), Trans-Ptomaineia would
offer bondholders the option of exchanging their existing bonds for new bonds
having less stringent payment terms-terms that Trans-Ptomaineia could
manage to pay. To induce as many bondholders as possible to agree to this
exchange, exchanging bondholders would be asked to waive various protections
in their bond indentures that can be waived without unanimity, such as cross
default and negative pledge covenants. Bondholders not agreeing to exchange
then would ftnd these contractual protections gone if a sufftcient majority of
other bondholders consent. 3 Years ago, Ecuador was reported as having used
this strategy,4 although its bonds may have lost about 40 percent of their net
present value as a result. s
On the other hand, approximately half of Trans-Ptomaineia's existing bond
issues did not require individual bondholder approval to change essential
payment terms. These bond issues included "collective action clauses,,,6 allowing
even payment terms to be changed through "supermajority voting.,,7 For these

debtor States is generally seen to be the future exclusion from the credit markets caused by
reputationalloss).
3

See Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L Rev
59,71 (2000) (discussing bond exchange offer with "exit consents'').
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Moody's Investors Service, Special Comment, Sovereign Restructurings: Putting Too Much Faith in Exit
Consents (Mar 2001) (reporting on Ecuador's use of this strategy in 2000).
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Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at 1194 n 25 (cited in note 1).
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Collective action clauses are often referred to as CACs.
Collective action clauses are clauses in individual loan agreements and bond indentures that
enable, typically, a "supermajority" of creditors (that is, some percentage of creditors higher than
a simple "greater-than-50-percent" majority) who are parties to any such contract, to modify
essential payment terms, such as the amount of principal owed, the interest rate thereon, and
maturities. Steven L. Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev 956, 1014 (2000). Some commentators advocate
including collective action clauses in all sovereign debt loan agreements and bond indentures. See,
for example, Barry Eichengreen, Toward a New International Financial Architecture 65-70 (Inst for Inti
Econ 1999); Christopher Greenwood and Hugh Mercer, Considerations of International Law, in Barry
Eichengreen and Richard Portes, eds, Crisis? What Crisis? OrderlY Workouts for Sovereign Debtors 103,
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issues, it would be easier to agree on debt restructuring terms with creditors
because, if and when the relevant supermajority of bondholders agreed to terms,
their agreement would bind any objecting bondholders.
The treaty approach to sovereign debt restructuring, Steif learned, would
rely on a newly-opened treaty among States, based on a model developed in
2000 8 and later proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).9 A debtor
State taking advantage of this treaty would agree to conduct its economic
policies so as to put itself back on the road to viable growth, in exchange for
which the treaty would give priority to repayment of new private moneys loaned
to the debtor State. The treaty also would empower the debtor State and a
supermajority of its creditors to approve a restructuring plan, which would bind
all creditors, notwithstanding the objections of holdouts against whom the plan
did not discriminate. to
Steif pondered: Which approach, the public law treaty or the private law
contract negotiation, would be more effective and pragmatic for his nation? And
should he recommend using a combination of these approaches? To answer
that, Steif flrst had to understand better the problems associated with sovereign
debt restructuring. His staff reported that there are three: the holdout or
collective action problem; the moral hazard problem; and the taxpayer-funding
problem.
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Transition in the Shadow of the International Order, 53 Emory L J 691,694 (2004).
Although the concept of a sovereign debt restructuring treaty was first conceived as early as 1995,
see Jeffrey D. Sachs, Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort 2-3, 8 (Apr 20, 1995) (Frank
D. Graham Lecture, Princeton University), unpublished manuscript available online at
<www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/pubs/intllr.pdf> (visited Feb 10,2005), it was
not modeled and substantively developed until 2000, see Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev 956 (cited in
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Under the treaty, a "supennajority" would require the afflnnative vote of creditors holding at least
two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of creditors voting on the restructuring
plan. Schwarcz, 53 Emory LJ at 1216-17 (cited in note 1).
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The collective action problem, Steif learned, arises because the conflicting
interests of a debtor State and its creditors make it difficult to reach complete
agreement on a restructuring plan, a difficulty exacerbated, and sometimes made
impossible, by the task of attempting to reach agreement among the State's many
creditors. I I Except for the bond issues (about half, Steif recalled) governed by
collective action clauses, the staff found, not unexpectedly, that most of the
remaining bond indentures require individual bondholder consent in order to
alter essential payment terms. Therefore, one or more bondholders may hold
out, hoping that the overall desire to reach an agreement will induce TransPtomaineia, or even other creditors, to buyout their claims or pay them a
premium. In practice, though, holdouts discourage all creditors, even those who
otherwise wish to reach an agreement, from agreeing to a debt restructuring
plan.
Worse, the staff reported, the collective action problem in TransPtomaineia's case is even more intractable because its bonds, like those of many
other nations, are held by hundreds, if not thousands, of investors, located in
dozens of countries. 12 Furthermore, in many cases the bonds are held in
nominee name, so it is difficult and costly to ascertain the actual identity of the
bondholder. 13 And, because the bonds are actively traded, the identity of
bondholders constantly changes. 14
Steif also learned that sovereign debt restructuring potentially creates a
second problem: moral hazard, or the greater tendency of people who are
protected from the consequences of risky behavior to engage in that behavior.
Moral hazard typically results where multilateral governmental entities such as
the IMF act as lender of last resort to financially troubled States, enabling them
to avoid default and its consequences. From the standpoint of a debtor State, the
moral hazard problem means that countries anticipating an IMF bailout might
have less reason to take a prudent economic course. IS From the standpoint of
creditors, the moral hazard problem is that lenders that anticipate being
protected from default might have a greater tendency to take unwarranted
financial risk.
Steif laughed! If the IMF is prepared to bail his country out without
needing to take a prudent economic course, fine with him and his countrymen.
11

For a detailed discussion of the collective action problem, see Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 95961,1003-06 (cited in note 1) and Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at 1192-94 (cited in note 1).

12

See Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1004 (cited in note 1).

13

Id.
Id at 1005.

15

For a detailed discussion of the moral hazard problem, see Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 961-63
(cited in note 1) and Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at 1194-95 (cited in note 1).
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But fat chance: as early as 1999 the IMP refused to act as a lender of last resort
when Ecuador defaulted on Eurobond payments, and it again refused in 2001 to
bail out Argentina. 16 Recent events have only confirmed that refusal.17
The third problem of sovereign debt restructuring, however, resonated
more clearly with Steif: where to obtain the funding so critical to ensuring that
essential governmental functions do not collapse during the restructuring
period? In the distant past, much of this money was provided by the IMP in the
form of loans. These loans, though, became politically controversial when the
taxpayers of IMP member States realized that they themselves were funding
them,18 thereby indirectly subsidizing not only defaulting States but also the
defaulting States' creditors. Where could Trans-Ptomaineia obtain this funding?
Having identified the problems-effectively the collective action problem
of binding holdout creditors to a reasonable debt restructuring plan, and the
problem of finding funding to maintain his nation's essential governmental
functions-Steif turned to finding possible solutions. Although it was already
nightfall, he was scheduled to present his findings to the Premier and other
Ministers the next day, and he would not fail. The way to vet this out, he
decided, was to bring his staff together, notwithstanding the late hour, to
intelligently debate the solutions.
By 9 PM, his staff had assembled-some grumbling-in Steifs large office.
"Which approach," he asked, "private law contract negotiation or the new public
law treaty, would be more effective and pragmatic for Trans-Ptomaineia?"
Tulani, the senior staffer, stood up and spoke on behalf of the others.
"Both approaches address the collective action problem," she said, "but the
treaty would solve it much more effectively. Under the treaty, supermajority
voting, requiring an affirmative vote in favor of a restructuring plan by TransPtomaineia's creditors holding merely two-thirds in amount of the outstanding
debt, would bind all of Trans-Ptomaineia's objecting creditors, even those who
vote negatively or fail to vote.,,19 'Without supermajority voting imposed by
treaty," Tulani continued, "any attempt by our nation to change the essential
terms of its bargain with creditors would often require unanimous approval.
16

But the IMP did agree to reschedule existing Argentine loans. Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at 1194-95
n 25 (cited in note 1).

17

For a detailed discussion of IMF practices in various sovereign debt crises, at least through 2002,
see Hal S. Scott, A Bankmptry Procedurefor Sovereign Debtors?, 37 Ind Law 103, 108-12 (2003).
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To understand why, see Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 963-66 (cited in note 7).

19

See Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1003-06 (cited in note 7) and Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at
1192-94 (cited in note 1) (discussing supermajority voting). See also Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev
at 1012-13 (cited in note 7) (proposing that any sovereign debt restructuring treaty be retroactive,
binding all existing creditors, and explaining why such retroactivity would be respected under
international law).

Summer 2005

385

Chicago Journal of International Law

And, although we theoretically could attempt to settle with creditors individually
notwithstanding their contractual protection of unanimity, the Allied Bank casezo
holds that this settlement would not bind other creditors, who could then sue
Trans-Ptomaineia on the original claims."
"Fascinating," Steif said. "But in all fairness, why should nations and
international organizations respect a treaty that potentially can discriminate
against those objecting creditors?"
Tulani replied, "Discrimination is impossible because, under the treaty, the
supermajority voting is done by classes of claims that are substantially similar to
the other claims of their class. z1 Therefore, a vote by holders of the requisite
supermajority that benefits their claims will also benefit holders of substantially
similar claims. And, if a sufficient minority of creditors of any class does not like
the restructuring plan, they can veto it."zZ
"In contrast," Tulani continued, "private law contract negotiation cannot
completely solve our collective action problem. Half of our nation's bond issues
lack collective action clauses. For those bonds, we would have to try using
exchange offers in order to coerce agreement to the terms of a restructuring
plan. Experience shows, however, that their utility is limited. Ecuador, for
example, tried using an exchange offering under which the new bonds had both
a buyback provision and a principal reinstatement provision that were
considered favorable to accepting creditors. At the same time, creditors
accepting the exchange would be bound by exit consentsZ3 that significantly
altered the nonfinancial terms of remaining outstanding bonds to the detriment
of holdout creditors. Even with this aggressive approach, 3 percent of Ecuador's
creditors continued to hold out and later sued Ecuador directly on their
uncompromised claims,z4 thereby jeopardizing the success of any future
exchange offering that fails to obtain 100 percent participation."z5

20

Allied Bank IntI v Banco CreditoAgricola de Cartago, 757 F2d 516, 521-23, (2d Cir 1985).

21

See Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at 1198 (cited in note 1). For a discussion of how a sovereign debt
restructuring treaty might divide claims into classes for supermajority voting purposes, see
Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1006 (cited in note 7).

22

All it would take to veto a restructuring plan is opposition by creditors holding either more than
one-third in amount, or at least one-half in number, of the claims represented by the class. See
Schwarcz, 53 Emory LJ at 1216-17 (cited in note 1).

23

See Moody's Investors Service, Sovereign Restructurings (cited in note 4).

24

See Elliott Assocs v Banco de la Nacion, 194 F3d 363, 380-81 (2d Cir 1999) (allowing a holdout
creditor in a bond exchange offer to sue the debtor State, Peru, directly for the holdout's full
claim).

25

Compare Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructllrings, 53 Emory L J 1115,
1139 (2004) (observing that "[p]ayments to holdouts in Ecuador and Uruguay, a potential windfall
for Argentina's litigants, and recent settlements benefiting holdouts under loan instruments may
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"Furthermore," Tulani noted, "bond exchange offers are extremely costly.
For example, Ecuador's bonds lost about 40 percent of their net present value
due, at least in part, to that nation's exchange offer?6 That does not even take
into account the transaction costs of effectuating the exchange offer! And
coercive exchange offers themselves may create legal problems.,,27
"You've got me thinking," responded Steif. "There's an important
additional reason why the treaty is much better than using exchange offers. Even
if we otherwise could persuade the requisite supermajority of bondholders in each
bond issue with collective action clauses, and 100 percent of bondholders in
every other bond issue, to agree to the terms of a restructuring plan, we'd still
face a potential collective action problem. Collective action clauses only operate
within a given bond issue, not across multiple bond issues. Therefore, investors
in one or more of our bond issues could hold out in order to get better terms! In
fact, now that I think of it, we also have some non bonded indebtedness in the
form of bank loans, and it's not inconceivable that individual banks also could
hold out. Under the treaty, though, that type of holdout behavior is impossible.
Creditors having the same priority of claims would vote as a single class, even if
they lack contractual affiliation with other creditors in the class. 28 Because the
claims of all of our bondholders and bank creditors are, in fact, pari passu,29 we
could classify all of them together and bind them, voting as single group, by one
supermajority vote. This is a powerful solution because it gives individual
holdouts much less ability to stymie the will of the vast majority of our nation's
creditors.,,3o
"Excellent point!" exclaimed Tulani. "From the standpoint of solving the
collective action problem, there's no question the treaty approach is much more
effective than the contractual approach. But there's an additiona4 and equallY
important, reason w~ Trans-Ptomaineia should go with the treaty approach: the contractual
approach simply doesn't address our need for funding to run essential

yet trigger an epidemic of holdout behavior under . . . bonds [not containing collective
action clauses],,).
26

Scott, 37 Inti Law at 108-09 (cited in note 17).

27

See, for example, A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politicalfy Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Resfnlcturing,
53 Emory L J 997, 1015-16 (2004).

28

See Schwarcz, 53 Emory LJ at 1205 (cited in note 1).

29

Creditors of a debtor State generally have pari passu, or equal and ratable, claims. Schwarcz, 85
Cornell L Rev at 1006 (cited in note 7).

30

See for additional support, Dickerson, 53 Emory LJ at 1016 (cited in note 27); Scott, 37 Inti Law
at 122 (cited in note 17).
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governmental services during the restructuring period. 31 We no longer can rely
on the IMF to provide this funding, so we'll have to borrow from commercial
sources, such as banks or capital-market investors. But without giving new
investors a priority over our existing indebtedness, there's no damn way they'll
lend to us. New investors simply won't want to be taxed by the claims of
existing creditors!32 The treaty, however, concretely solves this problem by
granting first priority to the claims of investors that provide the restructuring
financing.,,33
Steif frowned. ''Why can't we simply issue new bonds that have priority,
under Trans-Ptomaineian law, to all existing creditor claims?"
"The reason," Tulani replied, "is two-fold. First, new investors would
worry that we simply could change Trans-Ptomaineian law in the future to take
away their priority.34 The second reason is that giving priority to new investors
under our nation's internal law might offend our existing creditors, and thereby
impair our access to future commercial credit.,,35
"Similarly," continued Tulani, "it would be impractical to give the new
bonds priority by trying to negotiate with our existing creditors to subordinate
their claims. Even though, in theory, they should agree to the subordination in
order to accommodate the restructuring financing,36 the reality is that we'd again
face an insurmountable collective action problem in trying to get all creditors on
board.,,37
"It's clear, then," exclaimed Steif. "1 will recommend to Premier Gursky
tomorrow that we go with the treaty approach. He may ask me, though, about
the mechanics of implementing that approach. For example, are we a party yet
to the treaty? What do we need to do to become a party to the treaty? And what
costs would we incur by choosing this approach?"
''Well, we're not yet a party to the treaty," responded Tulani, "but it's fairly
easy to become a party. All we need to do is to have the Parliament enact
legislation making the treaty effective under our internal law. 38 Then, under our

31

See Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptry
Framework Be Strnctured?, 53 Emory L J 763, 775 (2004) (arguing that "[a] final shortcoming of [a
contractual approach] is that it does not address the sovereign's need for new financing").

32

Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 986 (cited in note 7).

33

See id at 986-97, 1033-34.

34

See id at 992.

35

See id at 993.

36

See, for example, id at 988 (arguing that permitting a debtor State to grant priority in order to
obtain restructuring financing should increase the expected value of existing nonpriority claims).

37

See, for example, Bolton and Skeel, 53 Emory L J at 775 (cited in note 31).

38

See Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1034 (cited in note 7).
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Constitution, the Premier and Minister of State can sign, and thereby ratify, the
treaty. The treaty binds creditors from ratifying countries because, as mentioned,
each country must also enact the legislation needed to make the treaty's
provisions part of that country's internal law. 39 Although that alone would be
insufficient to bind creditors from nonratifying countries-and, because only a
dozen countries have so far signed the treaty, it's almost certain that some of our
bondholders are from nonratifying countries-we still should be okay because
the Minister of Law believes the treaty should also bind creditors whose debt
instruments are governed by the law of a ratifying country.40 All of TransPtomaineia's debt is evidenced by bond indentures or loan agreements governed
by either New York or United Kingdom law41 and, happily, both the United
States and the UK have already ratified the treaty."
"But I thought the US Government has been opposing the treaty!"
exclaimed Steif.
"For years they had," Tulani explained. 42 "Until they realized that simple
contracting can't be the full answer. Then they bowed to international pressure
to sign." "The costs of using the treaty also should be minimal," Tulani
continued. "The treaty is largely self-administering. We would simply negotiate
with our creditors to determine mutually acceptable terms on which to
restructure our debt. The treaty itself provides powerful aids to induce this
negotiation. 43 We can't, for example, cram an unreasonable restructuring plan
down the throats of our creditors; if we tried that, creditors damn well wouldn't
approve it. 44 On the other hand, creditors won't want to veto a reasonable plan
because, until a plan's approved, they won't begin to be paid under it."
"Out-of-pocket costs likewise should be minimal. The IMF would perform
the treaty's few administrative tasks. 45 Disputes should rarely arise because the
treaty's rules are narrowly crafted to minimize adjudicatory discretion. 46 Any
39

See id.

40

See id at 1017.

41

This is the nonn for sovereign debt generally. See Schwarcz, 53 Emory L J at 1208 (cited in note
1).

42

See Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order nor Chaos: The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53
Emory L J 657, 658 (2004) (referring to US Treasury Department preference for the "marketoriented" contractual approach).

43

Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1020-22 (cited in note 7).

44

Recall that opposition by creditors holding either more than one-third in amount, or at least onehalf in number, of the claims represented by the class will veto a restructuring plan. See text
accompanying note 22.

45

Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1022 (cited in note 7).

46

See id at 1028 (arguing also that "[t]he only interpretative disputes that might arise would concern
either the good faith requirement for filing or the right of creditors to object to an excessive
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disputes that do arise probably would be limited to disagreement with existing
creditors over the amount of restructuring fmancing that we request. 47 I don't
anticipate we'd have that disagreement, but if we do it would be quickly resolved
through arbitration supervised by the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, or ICSID. 48 This is an arm of the World Bank that we've
relied on many times before for arbitrating investment disputes between our
nation and foreign nationals. The only cost is nominal: ICSID charges for use of
its arbitration facilities.,,49
Steif sighed with relief, both for himself and his nation: "What good
fortune for the people of Trans-Ptomaineia, and indeed for all of TransPtomaineia's honest creditors, that this sovereign debt restructuring treaty now
exists. A year earlier, and it would have been a very different story!"

amount of restructuring financing [but] disputes over whether bankruptcy filings are made in
good faith are extremely unusual even in a corporate context, [and] corporate creditors 'very
rarely' object to an amount of [restructuring] financing as excessive, and in a sovereign debt
restructuring, the need to object should be equally rare because of the public scrutiny involved").
47

Id.

48

See id at 1024-28 (discussing ICSID arbitration, and proposing that a tribunal based on the
ICSID model be used for adjudicating sovereign debt restructuring disputes). See also Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965),
art 1, 17 UST 1270 (1966).

49

Schwarcz, 85 Cornell L Rev at 1025 (cited in note 7).
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